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ASK ME NO QUESTIONS AND
I’LL TELL YOU NO LIES1:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FALSEHOODS
IN BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS
Michelle Roberts*
American voters have come to expect exaggeration, distortion, and
mudslinging in political campaigns, but do campaigners have a First
Amendment right to blatantly lie—to simply make up false statistics and
“facts”? A recent appellate court suggests that lying is permissible in
initiative and referendum campaigns. However, providing constitutional
protection for such statements undermines the most compelling
justification for the right to free speech: preservation of enlightened selfgovernment. Voters cannot be expected to govern wisely or in accordance
with their consciences when they are subjected to a barrage of lies. The
Supreme Court already recognizes discrete areas where free speech rights
are curtailed because of significant personal or public interests in protecting
reputations, consumer choices, and governmental processes. Likewise, the
Court should recognize that falsehoods told with actual malice in ballot
campaigns are exempt from First Amendment protection.

1. BING CROSBY AND THE ANDREWS SISTERS, Ask Me No Questions (And I’ll Tell You
No Lies), on THEIR COMPLETE RECORDINGS TOGETHER (MCA Records 1996). A version of the
phrase seems to have originated with “Ask me no questions, and I’ll tell you no fibs” in Act III of
Oliver Goldsmith’s 1773 play, SHE STOOPS TO CONQUER. E.g., JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR
SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 401 (10th ed. 1919). The phrase has proved
popular with generations of musicians. E.g., B.B. KING, Ask Me No Questions, on INDIANOLA
MISSISSIPPI SEEDS (MCA 1970); LYNYRD SKYNYRD, Don’t Ask Me No Questions, on SECOND
HELPING (MCA 1974).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School. With whole-hearted thanks to
Professors John T. Nockleby and Justin Levitt, both of whom generously offered advice and
insight in the drafting process, and to the editors and staff of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Review, who tirelessly combed through the details to get the article publication-ready.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Pinocchio failed to heed warnings that he should not lie, the
consequences were swift and undeniable.2 Pinocchio’s animated nose tip
jutted ever farther from his face as branches sprouted from it.3 “You see,
Pinocchio, a lie keeps growing and growing until it’s as plain as the nose
on your face,” the fairy explained.4 Unfortunately, in the world of adult
politics, the lies are not so plain. A substantial number of voters admitted
to encountering false information in the previous election cycle, and despite
this knowledge, poll data indicated “strong evidence that voters were
substantially misinformed” about many prominent election issues.5
In an effort to deter lying in political campaigns, at least sixteen states
have enacted laws making it illegal to make or publish false statements
intended to influence political campaigns (“falsehood statutes”).6 While
the statutes do not all explicitly prohibit false statements “of fact,” it is
implicit that the regulations apply to facts since those are the only kinds of
statements that would be provably false.7 Of the sixteen states with
falsehood statutes, nine specifically outlaw such statements in ballot

2. See Pinocchio (1940), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/media/rm1513393664/tt0032910
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (showing his lengthy nose as a result of lying).
3. Id.
4. Memorable Quotes for Pinocchio (1940), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032910
/quotes (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
5. CLAY RAMSAY ET AL., MISINFORMATION AND THE 2010 ELECTION: A STUDY OF THE
US ELECTORATE 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec10
/Misinformation_Dec10_rpt.pdf.
6. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271
(West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 42
(West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (West
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (2011); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 16.1-10-24 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.21–3517.22 (LexisNexis 2011); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.335 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-8-1 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN § 12.05 (West 2011).
7. E.g., Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981) (finding that a precursor
statute to Minnesota Statute Section 211B.06 was directed at false factual statements and not at
extreme inferences such as voting “no” on the budget demonstrates lack of support for any of the
individual items in the budget); B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049-CV, 2006 WL
954093, at *2 (Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006) (requiring evidence of factual
misrepresentation before determining whether there is a prima facie showing for a Minnesota
Statute Section 211B.06 complaint).
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question campaigns.8 While most of the prohibitions have been on the
books for years, recent court rulings have raised questions about whether
such prohibitions are constitutional.9
The rulings suggest that partisans in ballot campaigns have a
constitutional right to blatantly lie, regardless of the consequences to the
electoral process.10 An Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on a
Minnesota statute prohibiting falsehoods told with actual malice in
initiative and referendum campaigns illustrates this point.11 In 281 Care
Committee v. Arneson, the Eighth Circuit determined that, as a contentbased regulation,12 Minnesota Statute Section 211B.06 should be analyzed
under “strict scrutiny.”13 Because the Minnesota statute failed to survive
strict scrutiny, it was declared unconstitutional and unenforceable for all
practical purposes.14 The Minnesota challenge was not the only one to
such laws; a challenge to a substantively similar law in Ohio was filed on
the heels of the appellate court’s 281 Care Committee decision.15
8. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-13-109 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1463 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 42 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
211B.06 (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-24 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3517.21–3517.22 (LexisNexis 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2011); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 20A-11-1103 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN § 12.05 (West 2011). Another seven
states have similar prohibitions directed at making false statements with regard to candidates
only. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (West
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-301 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (2011); WASH.
REV. CODE. § 42.17A.335 (2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1 (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 2-19-142 (2011).
9. E.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 61 (2012); COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775,
2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2012). The latter case was dismissed due to lack of
standing. COAST Candidates, 2012 WL 4322517, at *5.
10. See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34 (finding that “knowingly false campaign
speech” is not “outside the protections of the First Amendment”).
11. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d. 621.
12. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 827 (2011) (defining content-based regulation as
“laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas
or views expressed”).
13. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34. Strict scrutiny test requires a compelling state
interest and a narrowly tailored statute to serve that interest for a regulation to be deemed
constitutional. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
14. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d 621; see also Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S at 818
(noting that content-based speech regulations will rarely be found permissible because they risk
silencing dissent and stifling individuality).
15. Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, COAST Candidates PAC v.
Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775, 2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2012).
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Unfortunately, despite the presence of important legal questions with
significant public policy implications, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
on the last day of the previous term.16 The Supreme Court should have
settled the issue by properly weighing all of the competing interests at
stake, including potential damage to the democratic processes that the
First Amendment17 is designed to protect.18 For guidance, the Court
should have looked to other regulated areas like defamation and perjury,
where other significant interests outweigh free speech rights.19 By taking
this approach, the Court would have recognized that falsehoods told with
actual malice20 in ballot campaigns should be categorically exempt from
First Amendment protection.
This Article argues that a limited categorical exemption for knowing
and reckless falsehoods told in ballot campaigns is appropriate in light of
the important democratic issues at stake and the structural space for free
speech provided by narrow application of the laws. Part II discusses the
history of First Amendment protections for political speech and the
Amendment’s relationship to the electoral process. Part III analyzes the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in 281 Care Committee and the law that the court
relied upon in its decision. Part IV provides a summary of how speech has
been constitutionally regulated in other areas, and advocates the regulation
of lying in the context of ballot campaigns.

16. Arneson v. 281 Care Comm., 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”).
18. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1251, 1253 (2006) (noting “‘democratic participation’” is frequently cited as the
First Amendment’s purpose).
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that
despite the First Amendment’s protection, a public official may recover for defamation if false
statements were made with actual malice because of the necessity of vigorous public debates and
discouragement of self-censorship); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012)
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (noting that perjured statements are not warranted First Amendment
protection because “[p]erjury undermines the function and province of the law and threatens the
integrity of judgments that are the basis of the legal system”) (citing United States v. Dunnigan,
507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993)).
20. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 (defining a statement with “actual malice” as one made
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
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II. HISTORICAL DEFERENCE FOR FREE SPEECH COLLIDES WITH
COMPELLING INTEREST IN PREVENTING CAMPAIGN FALSEHOODS
While four values have been said to underpin the guarantees of the
First Amendment—”self-realization, truth-seeking, democratic participation
and social adaptability”— judges most frequently invoke democratic
participation as the driving purpose in their First Amendment decisions.21
Political speech is central to the historical and modern purpose of the First
Amendment.22 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Supreme Court discussed the First Amendment’s “fullest and most urgent
application” to campaign speech.23 The Court underscored that “[t]he right
of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary
means to protect it.”24 This prerequisite to enlightened democracy prevents
temporary majorities from exercising the power to determine not only right
and wrong, but also true and false.25 “No other nation claims as fierce and
stringent a system of legal protection for speech.”26
Courts, however, sometimes give insufficient weight to the
government’s interest in protecting the electoral process itself.27 They
overlook the fact that even the most basic rights are illusory if the right to
vote and self-determine are impaired.28 They fail to balance what Justice
Breyer recognized as the tension between the ability to engage in as much
speech as one wants and public confidence in the electoral process.29
Despite the insufficient weight given to concerns for the electoral
process over the years, states have a legitimate interest in protecting the
21. Murchison, supra note 18.
22. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010).
23. Id. at 898.
24. Id.
25. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
26. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 225, 229 (1992).
27. Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82
TUL. L. REV. 889, 891 (2008).
28. See id. at 897 (stating that once the public becomes distrustful of campaign
advertising, the “integrity of the election process” is undermined).
29. Justice Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 245, 253 (2002) (discussing this tension in the context of campaign finance limitations).
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integrity of the electoral process.30 The Supreme Court has recognized that
state interest, even as it has moved to curtail speech regulations.31 For
example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, although the Court
struck down a law prohibiting anonymous campaign speech, it recognized
that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and libel in
campaigns where false statements might have “serious adverse
consequences” for a voting public that could not fairly evaluate the
proposed law before it.32 Specifically, the McIntyre leaflet urged citizens
to vote against a school tax levy in order to stop “wast[ing] . . . taxpayer
dollars.”33 Yet, the distributor of the pamphlets was not accused of
promoting factual inaccuracies, but only of violating the anonymous speech
statute.34 In ruling that anonymous speech could not be prohibited, the
Court noted that Ohio had already addressed fraud concerns by enacting
other statutes prohibiting dissemination of falsehoods about candidates and
issue-driven ballot measures.35 Those statutes were quoted by the Court as
part of its reasoning in reaching its holding,36 and incidentally, were very
similar to Minnesota statute section 211B.06.37
Concern about adverse consequences in elections—namely that voters
will be deceived into casting ballots based on false information—may be
even more acute in an age when fraud and misinformation spread faster and
farther than it ever could have without modern technology.38 Ideally,
voters would carefully consider and educate themselves on ballot measures

30. E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).
31. Id.; Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982).
32. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349.
33. Id. at 337 n.2.
34. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988),
repealed by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.21–3517.22 (West 2011).
35. The Court specifically mentioned OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3599.09.1(B)–
3599.09.2(B) (West 1988). McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349.
36. Id. at 349–51.
37. Compare § 3599.09.1(B) (banning general publication advocating for a certain
candidate or position if there is no name or contact information of the individual or group
responsible for the message), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011) (making it a gross
misdemeanor for a person to be involved in the preparation or dissemination of a publication that
promotes a false message).
38. See Terri R. Day, “Nasty as They Wanna Be” Politics: Clean Campaigning and the
First Amendment, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 647, 649 (2009) (noting the oft-cited concern about
technology’s ability to spread negative material).
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to prepare for Election Day; however, reality often defies that aspiration.39
Many voters are instead at the mercy of television advertising.40
Furthermore, even if voters wanted to educate themselves, many ballot
measures are technical and complicated.41 The lengthy explanatory voter
pamphlets are of little help because the reading skills required to
understand the proposed laws are too high for many;42 roughly fourteen and
a half percent of Americans lack the ability to read anything more than
short, commonplace prose.43 Lastly, the ability of fast-paced digital media
to turn negative campaign statements into overnight “tidal waves” further
confuses voters and fuels fear that the electoral process is compromised by
“pervasive and exaggerated mud-slinging.”44
Polls indicate that this concern is warranted.45
Campaign
misinformation and the perception of misinformation have a measurable
effect on voters.46 In a 2010 study conducted by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, researchers
found that a substantial quantity of voters encountered misleading
information in the 2010 election.47 Perhaps more importantly, researchers
found strong evidence that although voters recognized some information as
false, they continued to remain substantially misinformed about prominent
issues.48 For example, only a small percentage of respondents accurately
39. Becky Kruse, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads
Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 130 (2001).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 144.
42. A study of California ballot initiatives from 1974 to 1980, for example, found that the
voter pamphlet explanation reading levels are well beyond the high school graduate level and
sometimes beyond college graduate level. Id. at 145.
43. Institute of Education Sciences, National Assessment of Adult Literacy: State &
County Estimates of Low Literacy, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/estimates/Overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
44. Day, supra note 38, at 649.
45. See generally RAMSAY ET. AL., supra note 5, at 2 (outlining the key findings of the
study); Dana Blanton, Fox News Poll: 24 Percent Believe Obama Not Born in U.S., FOX NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/07/fox-news-poll-24-percent-believeobama-born/ (reporting that one-quarter of voters still believe President Obama is not a naturalborn citizen).
46. See generally RAMSAY ET. AL., supra note 5, at 4–15 (detailing the effects of
campaign misinformation on key issues, including the stimulus legislation, health care reform and
climate change).
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 4–15.
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stated what economists had been saying about recession stimulus funding
approved by Congress.49 The misinformation was so pervasive that the
respondents’ varying levels of education had little impact on their ability to
differentiate truthful statements from false ones.50
The danger of misinformed and misled voters may be even more
disconcerting in the direct democracy of ballot measure campaigns, where
voters are, in effect, legislators.51 Currently, twenty-four states permit
direct democracy in the form of referendums or initiatives, and all fifty
states allow legislatures to refer questions to voters, who then make law by
approving or disapproving of policy or taxes.52 In essence, voters have
become “a fourth branch of government.”53 Unlike the other branches of
government, however, these citizen-legislators do not have aides and
advisors to assist them in deciphering the accurate and pertinent
information needed to make decisions.54 Problems like poor drafting, a
confusing number of ballot questions, ineffective voter education, and the
failure of voters to account for a law’s effects already plague direct
democracy.55 Some ballot measures are even “drawn to confuse voters into
voting ‘incorrectly’—in a manner at odds with their [political]
preferences.”56 Given all these challenges and voters’ susceptibility to
misinformation, states should be permitted to regulate those who attempt to
intentionally deceive citizen legislators. Minnesota statute section 211B.06
and similar laws are just such an effort to address these concerns.57
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. See Christopher A. Coury, Note, Direct Democracy Through Initiative and
Referendum: Checking the Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 573 (1994)
(noting that drafters of state constitutions included referendum and initiative powers in the
constitutions because they “intended to empower the people to introduce, consider, and vote upon
issues themselves”).
52. What are ballot propositions, initiatives, and referendums?, INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013).
53. Coury, supra note 51, at 574.
54. Kruse, supra note 39, at 157–58.
55. Coury, supra note 51, at 574.
56. Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
903, 908 (2006).
57. The Minnesota statute at issue in 281 Care Comm. has deep origins in the state’s
history. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625. Minnesota began criminalizing knowingly false
speech about political candidates in 1893. Id. False statements about issue-related speech were
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III. EIGHTH CIRCUIT FINDS LYING IN BALLOT CAMPAIGNS SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO HIGHEST LEVEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
Minnesota’s statute section 211B.06(1) prohibits false statements
made knowingly or recklessly about both candidates and ballot questions.58
Specifically, it states:
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally
participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of
paid political advertising or campaign material with respect to
the personal or political character or acts of a candidate, or
with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed
or tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate for
nomination or election of a public office or to promote or
defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows
is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of
whether it is false.59
Three advocacy groups that opposed school funding ballot
initiatives challenged the regulation, which falls within the Minnesota
Fair Campaign Practices Act, on the grounds that it violated the First
Amendment free speech guarantees.60 As a preliminary matter, the
district court found the case non-justiciable for lack of standing and
ripeness.61 Nonetheless, the district court addressed the merits of the case
and concluded that the false statements prohibited by the statute fell
outside of First Amendment protections.62 The Eighth Circuit disagreed
with the lower court on both justiciability and the First Amendment
question.63 While both courts spent considerable time analyzing whether
added to the prohibition nearly a century later. Id.; see also Day, supra note 38, at 659 (citing
statutes like Minnesota’s as a response to growing concerns about the effect of negative speech on
the electoral process).
58. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011).
59. Id.
60. 281 CARE Comm. v. Arneson, No. 08-CV-5215, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at
*1–2 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010), rev’d and vacated, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 61 (2012); see generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 n.1
(1995) (explaining that the First Amendment extends to state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
61. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *7, *11–12, *14–15.
62. Id. at *19.
63. 281 Care Comm v. Arneson., 638 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
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the plaintiffs had standing and whether their claim was ripe in the absence
of an actual prosecution,64 this Note will focus only on the First
Amendment issues addressed by the courts.
A. Trial Court in 281 Care Committee Finds That Regulation of False
Statements Made with Actual Malice Does Not Violate the
First Amendment
The three plaintiff groups did not specifically outline what prohibited
statements they hoped to make,65 but they wanted to voice their opposition
to bond initiatives that would increase school funding, and they did so by
making statements that could be interpreted as recklessly false statements.66
In 2006, officials investigated one of the plaintiff groups, W.I.S.E. Citizen
Committee, after school district officials lodged a complaint with the
Office of Administrative Hearings.67 The complaint centered around the
use of a consultant who, immediately prior to the election, mailed voters a
brochure using significantly lower student enrollment numbers and
inconsistent cost figures to undermine the argument for additional school
funding; the consultant later admitted that the figures were wrong.68
Although the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee was never prosecuted, an
administrative judge found that a prima facie case of intentional falsehoods
had been established.69 Because section 211B.06 could only be applied to
statements of fact, not criticisms or unfavorable deductions70—a precedent
established by a 1981 Minnesota Supreme Court case71—the administrative
judge called an evidentiary hearing for only three of the seventeen

64. Id. at 627–33; Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *5–19.
65. Plaintiffs argued that the law “inhibit[ed] plaintiffs’ ability to speak freely against
these ballot initiatives” without elaborating on the kinds of statements that they wanted to make.
281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625.
66. Brief for Appellant at 10–11, 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir.
2011) (No. 10-1558).
67. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 625–26 (discussing the complaint which alleged that
the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee had prepared and distributed campaign materials containing false
statement of facts that it knew to be false).
68. Lynda Jensen, Levy Opponents Wish to Overturn False Campaign Materials Law,
HERALD J., (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.herald-journal.com/archives/2007/stories/wise.html.
69. B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049-CV, 2006 WL 954093, at *1 (Minn.
Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006).
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011).
71. Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981).
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statements about which there were complaints.72 An administrative panel
later dismissed the complaint against the W.I.S.E. Citizen Committee.73
During the following year, 281 Care Committee successfully waged a
vigorous campaign to defeat a school funding initiative for the Robbinsdale
Public School District.74 The campaign included a 36–second taped phone
message to voters which implied that students from North Minneapolis, who
were allowed to attend schools in the district through open enrollment,
brought “problems” and were involved in “gang fights” and “bomb
threats.”75 The superintendent said the group’s tactics were “without
conscience” and “racist”76—a charge denied by the plaintiffs.77 In addition,
the superintendent told the media that the school “district was investigating
281 Care Committee and exploring ways to deal with ‘false’ information that
it spread” during the campaign.78 That committee, along with the W.I.S.E.
Citizen Committee and another group, challenged Minnesota statute section
211B.06.79 The complaint asserted that the advocacy groups had a
constitutional right to make statements that “w[ould] be interpreted by others
as false, misleading, non-defamatory, unfavorable or unfair deductions or
inferences.”80 After all, the primary purpose of the grassroots advocacy
groups was “to make statements regarding the effect of ballot questions
72. The three statements that were subject to an evidentiary hearing because they could be
proved false were (1) “[District] taxpayers saw their tax support of schools shift from property
taxes to state income taxes a few years ago,” (2) The construction contract signed by the district
would take the district out of most decisions about the project and quality control, and (3) The
head of W.I.S.E. had “personally been offered a bribe” by the school district’s architect.
B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., 2006 WL 954093 at *5, *7, *9. Other statements, however, were
found not to merit an evidentiary hearing because they seemed to be opinions. Those statements
included ones like “we don’t have a growth/space problem” and others that merely questioned
whether more construction should be done. Id. at *3, *4.
73. E.g., 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.
74. Id.
75. Paul Levy, Robbinsdale School Official Added to Suit: An Anti-Levy Group Said it
Has Added the School Superintendent for Describing its Tactics as Racist, STAR TRIBUNE
(MINN.), Nov. 10, 2007, at 7B.
76. Id. North Minneapolis has seen a significant demographic shift in the last 30 years,
with African-Americans now representing 43 percent of the population. Kerry Ashmore, Ethnic
Makeup Changed in North Minneapolis, DAILY PLANET (June 7, 2011),
http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/news/2011/06/07/ethnic-makeup-changed-north-minneapolis.
77. Levy, supra note 75.
78. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.
79. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *2.
80. Id. at *7.
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which are ‘not easily representative or supportable by fact.’”81
In its order, the district court gave credence to the committees’
argument that it had a right to make statements that others might interpret
as false.82 The order stated that such false statements would not be subject
to prosecution under the statute83 because the law only targeted false
statements of fact made with actual malice, not mere criticisms or
unfavorable deductions.84 It was reasoned that “[g]ood faith or negligent
errors of fact are protected by the First Amendment; knowing falsehoods
are not. The same holds true of factual errors in campaign statements.”85
Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does not prohibit all false statements or
even negligent ones, but only those “made with knowledge of their falsity,
or with reckless disregard of whether they are true or false.”86 Finding that
such regulations fell within a First Amendment categorical exemption
already recognized by the Supreme Court, the district court held that the
Minnesota law did not violate the U.S. Constitution.87
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on several Supreme
Court cases, which had held that the state could punish false statements
made with actual malice, even in a political context.88 For example, Brown
v. Hartlage, which challenged a Kentucky statute that prohibited candidates
from offering a material benefit in exchange for votes,89 the Supreme Court
determined that the statute violated the First Amendment because it lacked
limitations.90 Yet, even as the Court in Brown held that the law was
unconstitutional, it recognized that states have a “legitimate interest in
upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself.”91 In considering that
81. Brief of Appellant, supra note 66, at 25.
82. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *7–8.
83. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06(1) (West 2011) (identifying the limited
circumstances under which false political speech is prohibited).
84. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *8.
85. Id. at *9.
86. Id. at *8 (citing the New York Times rule).
87. Id. at *19.
88. Id. at *9–12.
89. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982).
90. Id. at 52–62. For example, the Court held that the state could prohibit candidates from
promising to give voters something of value in exchange for their votes because the state was
entitled to prevent vote-buying. Id. at 54. It could not, however, interpret the prohibition to include
statements promising a public good, like committing to reduce one’s salary if elected. Id. at 57–58.
91. Id. at 52.
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interest and important First Amendment principles,92 the Supreme Court
concluded the state could not prosecute all false statements,93 but only
those made in bad faith or with actual malice.94 Similarly, in 281 Care
Committee, the District Court noted that Minnesota statute section 211B.06
contained such an appropriate limitation.95
For similar reasons, the district court cited Garrison v. Louisiana,96 a
ruling in which the Supreme Court extended guidelines on civil defamation
to criminal defamation cases.97 The Court struck down Louisiana’s
criminal defamation statute because it made no distinction between false
statements made with ill will and those made with a reasonable belief in
their truthfulness. 98 Still, the Garrison court noted that calculated
falsehoods should be regarded differently, even in the context of politics:
That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not
automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the
Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at
odds with the premises of democratic government and with the
orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is
to be effected.99
In short, lying and democracy stand at odds with each other.
B. Eighth Circuit Finds No Exemption for Regulations like Minnesota’s
Statute and Orders Law Subjected to Strict Scrutiny
Despite the persuasive dicta in prior Supreme Court decisions, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s holding on the
constitutionality of the Minnesota statute, finding such falsehoods to be
protected by the First Amendment.100 Accordingly, the case was remanded

92. Id. at 52–53.
93. Id. at 61.
94. Id. at 61–62.
95. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *9.
96. Id. at *8.
97. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
98. Id. at 78.
99. Id. at 75.
100. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 626.
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for analysis under a strict scrutiny test,101 and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.102 While the Eighth Circuit did not unequivocally declare the
Minnesota statute unconstitutional,103 content-based restrictions rarely
survive strict scrutiny, which requires a compelling state interest and a law
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.104 The Eighth Circuit rejected the
district court’s conclusion that knowingly false speech was among the
categories of existing exceptions—such as fighting words, obscenity, child
pornography and defamation—which are not subject to the stringent strict
scrutiny analysis.105
The Eight Circuit accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that the First
Amendment exemption for false speech made with actual malice only
applied to defamation, not more generally to false speech.106 It held that
the exemption for defamatory speech was not an exemption for all reckless
or knowingly false speech.107 The court reasoned that defamation law is
driven not only by falsehood, but by the important private interests of
individuals whose reputations are damaged by defamatory speech.108 The
applicability of those defamation law principles to all false political speech
could not be assumed because not all false political speech implicates a
private interest.109 Therefore, defamation law cannot extend to political
speech.110 The court noted that a government entity cannot bring a
defamation claim, and “[a] ballot initiative clearly cannot be the victim of
character assassination.”111 Although the court acknowledged that some
language from defamation cases could be read broadly enough to cover
non-defamatory falsehoods, it did not examine the interests that undergird

101. Id. at 636.
102. Arneson v. 281 Care Comm., 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
103. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34.
104. Constitutional Law, supra note 12 (noting that regulations based on content are
“strongly presumed to be invalid).
105. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 633–34 (“We find that the Supreme Court has never
placed knowingly false campaign speech categorically outside the protection of the First
Amendment and we will not do so today.”).
106. Id. at 634–35.
107. Id. at 634.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634.

07. ROBERTS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/15/2013 2:03 PM

FIRST AMENDMENT AND FALSEHOODS IN CAMPAIGNS

51

other prohibitions against false speech.112
The Eighth Circuit was especially reluctant to allow a First
Amendment exemption for “quintessential political speech.”113 It noted
that “[t]he breadth of protection afforded to political speech under the First
Amendment is difficult to overstate.”114 In particular, the Eighth Circuit
pointed out that earlier in 2011, the Supreme Court struck down a tort
verdict won by the grieving father of a U.S. Marine, whose funeral was
protested by members of a controversial anti-gay church.115 That ruling
followed Citizens United v. Federal Elections Committee, where the Court
struck down a ban on limiting corporate political contributions while
emphasizing the special status of political speech under the First
Amendment.116 The Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]he Citizens United Court
went so far as to suggest that there may be a bright-line rule against
restrictions on political speech.”117
In addition, the Eighth Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit,
which invalidated the Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds.118
The Stolen Valor Act subjected anyone who falsely claimed to have
received a military decoration to a fine and up to one year in prison.119 In
invalidating the law, the Ninth Circuit held that “the right to speak and
write whatever one chooses—including, to some degree, worthless,
offensive, and demonstrable untruths”—was an essential protection
afforded by the First Amendment.120
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion affirmed the judgment, but it
is more circumspect.121 Four justices, in a plurality opinion authored by
Justice Kennedy, declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional because it

112. Id.
113. Id. at 635.
114. Id. at 635 n.3.
115. Id.; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
116. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
117. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 635 n.3.
118. United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S.
Ct. 2537 (2012).
119. Military Medals or Decorations, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c) (2006), invalidated by
United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
120. Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1205.
121. United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez II), 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality).
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fell outside recognized exemptions to First Amendment protection.122
Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan reasoned that the law was
unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored enough to survive
intermediate scrutiny,123 since it applied to any false statement made about
a military decoration at any time, whether in a political debate or at
home.124 Furthermore, Justice Breyer said that given the broad drafting, the
statute worked a “disproportionate constitutional harm” as the scope of the
speech restriction was too broad for the interest that was being protected.125
The Stolen Valor Act is distinguishable in a significant way from the
Minnesota law.126 Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does not have the
main drafting infirmary that plagued the Stolen Valor Act since it applies
only to reckless and knowing falsehoods told for a specific purpose.127
Furthermore, the Minnesota law mirrors the Ohio statute the Court cited in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission to bolster its decision to strike
down the prohibition on anonymous speech.128 The McIntyre court agreed
that the state’s interest in preventing voter deception “carries special weight
during election campaigns” and noted that the state already protected
voters’ interests with a statute containing language much like Minnesota
statute section 211B.06.129 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have
agreed to consider the constitutionality of the law.130
IV. FALSE STATEMENTS MADE WITH ACTUAL MALICE IN BALLOT
CAMPAIGNS SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Few people would argue that deliberate lies in political campaigns are
122. Id. at 2543–47.
123. Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring); see also id. at 2555 (finding the
goal of preserving the honor of military decorations was a substantial justification but one that
could be achieved in a less burdensome way).
124. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring); see also id. at 2547
(Kennedy, J., plurality).
125. Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., concurring).
126. Compare Military Medals or Decorations, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)–(c) (2006) (subjecting
any false statement to criminal prosecution), invalidated by United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d
1198 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West
2001) (proscribing only known and reckless falsehoods).
127. See § 211B.06(1).
128. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995).
129. Id.
130. Arneson, 133 S. Ct. 61.
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something to be celebrated or condoned,131 and in light of the risks that
deliberate lies pose to the democratic process, the Supreme Court should
grant states the power to prevent or remedy such lies with statutes like
Minnesota statute section 211B.06. Permitting limits on false campaign
speech does not represent a departure from the court’s reluctance to curtail
free speech.132 In fact, allowing states to enact falsehood statutes comports
with other First Amendment exemptions—such as defamation, fraud, and
perjury—which are already recognized by the Court.133 Based on those
previous First Amendment carve-outs and the important interests at stake
here, a categorical exemption should be recognized for falsehoods, told
recklessly or knowingly, in ballot question campaigns.
A. Falsehoods Told with Actual Malice Do Not
Benefit the Marketplace of Ideas
Courts sometimes treat false speech as a participant in the
“‘marketplace’” of ideas.134 Justice Holmes, creator of the marketplace
metaphor, reasoned that society arrived at “ultimate good” through the free
trade of ideas and that the “‘best test for the truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”135 The well-worn
metaphor, however, presupposes that the idea market is efficient enough to

131. See generally 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th Cir. 2011)
(conceding that the state may have been right in describing knowing falsehoods as “often
valueless”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
132. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas . . . .”).
133. See United States v. Alvarez (Alvarez II), 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (Kennedy, J.,
plurality) (noting that perjured statements are not protected under the First Amendment; United
States v. Alvarez (Alvarez I), 617 F.3d 1198, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that historically speech
that is fraudulent, dangerous or injurious is unprotected); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72
(holding that libelous speech has always been unprotected).
134. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing
addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas
that had only sellers and no buyers.”).
135. BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS 26 (2008)
(citation omitted).
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actually sort out good and bad information, the truth from a falsehood.136
Pragmatically speaking, some false statements are inevitable,137 and
courts have occasionally suggested they even enhance the exchange of
ideas.138 For example, in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
said false statements are valuable because they bring “clearer the
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error.”139 The Court in that case, however, was not addressing falsehoods
told with actual malice.140 Instead, the case centered on a Civil Rights-era
newspaper advertisement containing factual errors regarding actions
undertaken by students and government officials at Alabama State College
after protests by African-American students.141 The law allowed a judge to
instruct the jury that the errors were “libelous per se”—requiring nothing
more than proof that the statement was untrue and that it involved the
plaintiff.142 In contrast, the Minnesota statute does not prohibit accidental
misstatements or falsehoods that the speaker reasonably believes to be true;
it specifically targets statements made with actual malice.143
Marketplace proponents argue that valueless speech can be checked
simply by putting more speech into the market,144 but that is not always the
case. In defamation cases, for example, the speaker’s free speech rights are
trumped by the victim’s reputational rights because a rebuttal of falsehoods
rarely undoes the harm caused by the lie.145 In other areas, too, social
science has proven that people are not rational shoppers in the marketplace

136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 48–49 (1982) (citing candidate’s mistake in
campaign speech and later retraction); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964).
138. See, e.g., State of Washington ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No!
Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 695 (Wash. 1998).
139. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19.
140. Id. at 285–86 (“[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks
the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands . . . . ”).
141. Id. at 258–59.
142. See id. at 263.
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011).
144. See Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1211 (finding a law criminalizing speech is inconsistent with
the First Amendment when the disfavored speech can simply be fought with more speech);
Goldman, supra note 27, at 899 (“[T]he proper remedy for false speech is more, not less, speech.”).
145. See Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1210.
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of ideas.146
Comedian Stephen Colbert dubbed the phenomenon
“truthiness”—an intuitive “from the gut” knowledge that disregards
evidence, logic or facts.147 It is the quality of preferring concepts or facts
one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true.148
Colbert was joking about then-President George W. Bush, but social
scientists have repeatedly found “people can maintain a high degree of
confidence in the validity of specific answers even when they know that
their overall [accuracy] rate is not very high.”149 People balance the
arguments for and against a particular hypothesis without sufficient regard
for the quality of the data; this behavior “gives rise to overconfidence when
people form a strong impression on the basis of limited knowledge.”150
The marketplace metaphor, however, relies on a different type of decisionmaking since it assumes voters in the idea market will assess facts and
make rational decisions.151 For that to work, people must be sufficiently
interested in and qualified to participate in an exchange driven by reason.152
“More speech” might be an adequate solution to combat disfavored speech,
but when used against false speech, it simply “leaves the listener with
conflicting facts and no basis on which to discern the truth.”153
Polling data confirms that the market does not work in the efficient
way imagined by Justice Holmes.154 Large portions of the electorate do not
or cannot distinguish true statements from false ones on important public
matters, as evidenced by the University of Maryland study showing voters
were substantially misinformed about prominent issues.155 In another poll
146. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants
of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 238,
242 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
147. THE COLBERT REPORT (Comedy Central television broadcast Oct. 17, 2005),
available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/24039/october-17-2005/theword---truthiness.
148. Id.
149. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 146, at 247.
150. Id. at 242.
151. See PINAIRE, supra note 135, at 32.
152. Id.
153. Kruse, supra note 39, at 162; see also Alvarez II, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and
Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that false factual statements are less likely to be valuable than true
factual statements).
154. See, e.g., RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 4.
155. Id.
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conducted in April 2011, Fox News found that nearly one-in-four voters
still believed that President Barack Obama was born outside the United
States, despite numerous stories debunking the rumor, birth
announcements, and official state records from the President’s birth state of
Hawaii.156 Some scholars speculate that the effect of misleading campaign
statements may be particularly acute for less-educated, lower-income,
minority, and women voters.157 Those voters are more likely than average
to vote against their actual position or not at all when confused by
misleading advertisements.158
B. The Risk of Chilling Legitimate Speech Is Not So Great That
Falsehoods Told with Actual Malice Should Be Tolerated
Beyond their faith in the marketplace of ideas, courts have expressed
concern that proscribing false speech chills legitimate speech.159 In N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court spoke of free speech requiring
“breathing space,” for people to speak without fearing liability for every
misstatement.160 The grass-roots advocacy groups in 281 Care Committee
averred that the risk of enforcement of Minnesota statute section 211B.06
chilled their speech in elections since they wanted “to make arguments that
[were] not grounded in facts.”161 The Eighth Circuit found the tactics used
by the groups came close enough to reckless disregard for the truth that it
was reasonable for them to modify their strategy.162 Similarly, challengers
to Ohio Revised Code section 3517.22(B)163 argued that their speech was
156. Blanton, supra note 45.
157. Kruse, supra note 39, at 131.
158. Id.
159. See 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 630.
160. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72.
161. 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 630.
162. Id.
163. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.22(B) (West 2011) (“No person, during the course of
any campaign in advocacy of or in opposition to the adoption of any ballot proposition or issue, by
means of campaign material, including sample ballots, an advertisement on radio or television or in
a newspaper or periodical, a public speech, a press release, or otherwise, shall knowingly and with
intent to affect the outcome of such campaign do any of the following: (1) Falsely identify the
source of a statement, issue statements under the name of another person without authorization, or
falsely state the endorsement of or opposition to a ballot proposition or issue by a person or
publication; (2) Post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate, a false statement,
either knowing the same to be false or acting with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,
that is designed to promote the adoption or defeat of any ballot proposition or issue.”).
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“tempered, chilled and/or stifled” 164 after a falsehoods complaint over
statements in the campaign for Cincinnati’s streetcar system was filed.165
The challengers’ argument was supported by the Attorney General of Ohio,
who filed an amicus brief in the District Court of Ohio.166 More
specifically, the attorney general stated that the law “fail[ed] to provide
adequate safeguards . . . against the chilling of political speech.”167
The risk of chilling political speech, however, has been used most
often by the Supreme Court to explain the Court’s refusal to proscribe all
false speech, including that which was sincerely undertaken.168 A sincere
statement, though factually inaccurate, is one believed by the speaker to be
true.169 On the other hand, insincere speech—a statement made with
knowledge falsity or reckless disregard of the truth—betrays the public
good by manipulating the debate.170 Most Americans would feel the
government was overreaching and stifling expression if it punished people
for sincerely made misstatements,171 and that is why the Supreme Court’s
defamation jurisprudence holds that sincere falsehoods sometimes need to
be protected.172

164. Verified Complaint, supra note 15, at 8.
165. Exhibit A - Complaint at 3–5, Cincinnatians for Progress v. COAST Candidates
PAC, No. 1:11cv775, 2012 WL 4322517 (No. 2011E-061) (detailing the 20 messages COAST
was accused of posting on Twitter alleging that city fire services were “browned out” to pay for a
streetcar project).
166. Brief of Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, as Amicus Curiae and in
Support of Neither Party, COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 1:11cv775,
2012 WL 4322517 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2012).
167. Id. at 6.
168. Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1209 (2008).
169. Id. at 1226.
170. Id. at 1226, 1254.
171. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (holding that only misstatements made with
actual malice could be proscribed by states); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (“Allowance of the defense
of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will
be deterred.”); see also Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1223 (“To a large degree, most of us would
probably feel that the government was reaching too far if it punished us for innocent errors.”).
172. Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1225.
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Insincere falsehoods, however, are another matter.173 Insincere
statements do not enhance the public debate or improve voters’ ability to
exercise their democratic rights.174 Instead, insincere falsehoods undermine
candid and healthy policy debates by seeking to win through
manipulation.175 Recognizing this important distinction, the Supreme
Court in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan held that while states could not
proscribe all falsehoods, they could regulate those told with actual
malice.176 Protecting false statements made negligently or inadvertently
offers enough breathing space for free speech to survive.177
Minnesota’s law provides precisely that same breathing space to
falsehoods in ballot campaigns.178 Minnesota statute section 211B.06 does
not cover all falsehoods, only factual ones that are told knowingly or
recklessly,179 and therefore does not seriously risk chilling legitimate
speech.180 Underscoring the careful balance achieved by the law,181 it is
important to note that neither criminal prosecutions nor state-initiated
enforcement proceeding have resulted from Minnesota’s campaign
falsehoods statute.182

173. See, e.g., Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62 (holding that only misstatements made with
actual malice could be proscribed by states); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (holding defamation of
public officials requires evidence of actual malice); see also Spottswood, supra note 168, at
1225–26 (explaining that sincerity and “truth” are closely related, while an insincere statement
does not accurately reflect the speaker’s belief).
174. See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1253.
175. See id. at 1253–54.
176. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
177. See id. at 287–88 (finding no actual malice and at most, negligence in newspaper’s
failure to check the accuracy of the advertisement).
178. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011); see also 281 CARE Comm. v.
Arneson, No. 08-CV-5215, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *19 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010)
(noting that only falsehoods told with actual malice are prohibited), rev’d and remanded, 638
F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
179. Arneson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *8.
180. Id. at *18–19.
181. Id. at *11.
182. See id. at *11–12.
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C. The Supreme Court Has Long Exempted Certain Types of Speech
From First Amendment Protection to Guard Personal and
State Interests Deemed Sufficiently Significant.
While the right to free speech has long been carefully protected, it has
never been absolute.183 Few would argue that speech should always take
precedence over other values. 184 Certain well-defined and limited
categories of speech are prohibited and punished without raising
constitutional problems.185 The exempted categories—including ones like
defamation, fraud and perjury, which will be addressed here—can be
defended because speech in these categories does not further truth or good
public policy.186 The Supreme Court has recognized that there are some
utterances that have “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and are
of such “slight social value as a step to truth” that their value is outweighed
by other interests.187 The Court has been reluctant to create new categories
of unprotected speech, but it has not said yet-unlisted categories cannot be
recognized.188 Unlike in United States v. Stevens, where the government
sought an exemption for materials that bore little resemblance to existing
exempted categories,189 Minnesota’s prohibition on falsehoods in ballot
campaigns shares the underlying interests and parameters for alreadyrecognized exemptions.190
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that courts are particularly,
and rightly, sensitive to prohibitions on false speech about the government
itself.191 Efforts to prohibit slander of the government have been rare and
controversial.192 The United States attempted to outlaw libel against the
183. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
184. See SAMUEL P. NELSON, BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE POLITICS OF FREE
SPEECH AND PLURALISM 41 (2005).
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
188. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (refusing to recognize
“‘depiction of animal cruelty’” as a new category of protected speech).
189. Id. at 1587.
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011) (outlawing perjury); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80
(1964) (discussing defamation).
191. See City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. 1923).
192. See id. at 88–89 (calling the Sedition Act of 1798 the “only” effort by the United
States to outlaw libel against the government, though the Espionage Act, as amended in May 16,
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government in the Sedition Act of 1798, prohibiting “false, scandalous and
malicious” statements meant to bring Congress or the President into
contempt or disrepute.193 President Thomas Jefferson declared the act a
“nullity,” pardoning anyone convicted under the act and remitting all
fines.194 The few courts that have addressed the question of government
libel have held that the government cannot make that claim.195
However, while the government has no reputational interest that can
be protected,196 the Supreme Court has deemed other interests that are less
important and far-reaching than the electoral as process worthy of
protection.197 An individual’s interest in preserving his or her reputation,
for example, is protectable despite the First Amendment.198 The Supreme
Court has held that states have a legitimate interest in guarding an
“individual’s right to the protection of his own good name.”199 This, of
course, falls within important limitations; good faith or sincerely believed
falsehoods are not punishable while ones told in bad faith are.200 States
must offer speakers more than a simple truth defense to pass constitutional
muster.201 States are limited in the types of defamation laws they can use to
1918, made it unlawful to use “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of
government of the United States.”). The Supreme Court also affirmed a wartime prosecution of
individuals who urged ammunition workers to strike by calling the president “cowardly.”
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1919). However, courts that have answered the
question of whether the government can be defamed have universally concluded that a
government entity may not sue for defamation. J. A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Right of
Governmental Entity to Maintain Action for Defamation, 45 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1972).
193. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. at 88.
194. Id. at 89.
195. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm., 638 F.3d at 634 (noting government has no cause of
action for defamation); Tribune Co., 139 N.E. at 90 (holding utterances that were not designed to
persuade others to engage in violent overthrow of the government were protected); see also
Bryant, Jr., supra note 193.
196. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
197. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assoc., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 623–
24 (2003) (citing choices about charitable giving as worthy of protection); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341
(citing individual reputation as a valid protectable interest).
198. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
199. Id.
200. See generally Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–81 (discussing the need for actual malice for
a successful claim).
201. See generally id. at 279 (“‘[A]ny one claiming to be defamed by the
communication must show actual malice or go remediless.”) (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan,
98 P. 281, 285 (Kan. 1908)).
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protect an individual’s reputational rights.202 Since the 1960s, the Supreme
Court has generally expanded free speech rights by narrowing defamation
protection;203 however, private individuals and public officials still enjoy
protection against some falsehoods.204 Specifically, private individuals are
permitted to seek remedy for these private harms.205
By contrast, the prohibition on reckless falsehoods in ballot
campaigns focuses on a more important interest of a “constitutional
dimension”:206 “the integrity of the election process.”207 To start, this
potential harm of a “constitutional dimension” is certainly weightier than
the monetary interests protected by the exclusion of some other types of
speech.208 While commercial speech generally enjoys less protection than
other types of expression,209 the Supreme Court has been clear that “the
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”210
Even shy of fraud, states may regulate deceptive advertising.211
Commentators suggest the latitude to proscribe such speech may be justified
because the deceived listener is giving up money or other resources, making
the statements akin to theft.212 Knowing or reckless falsehoods in ballot
campaign materials may not be intended for the speaker’s pecuniary gain,
but such falsehoods potentially impinge on a more fundamental possession:
effective self-governance.213 Without the benefit of accurate information in
202. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (finding that states may not impose liability without fault
and must limit damages to actual injury for private individuals); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
280 (finding actual malice is required for defamation of public officials).
203. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
204. See generally Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (noting the dignity and worth that is tied to an
individual’s protection of his name).
205. See generally id.
206. Goldman, supra note 27, at 914.
207. Brief of Appellees at 23, 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011)
(No. 10-1558).
208. See Goldman, supra note 27, at 913–14.
209. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980).
210. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612.
211. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
212. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1114 (2006).
213. See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1232.

07. ROBERTS (DO NOT DELETE)

62

5/15/2013 2:03 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:37

ballot campaigns, people cannot govern themselves effectively or accurately
detect abuses by government authorities.214
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has been willing to
acknowledge that reputational and pecuniary interests sometimes justify
exempting speech from First Amendment protection. There is, however,
another protectable interest that justifies exemption from the First
Amendment: the integrity of governmental systems.215 Perjury—a lie,
sometimes even one not told under oath—is a “crime against the state.”216
It is proscribed because “[p]erjury undermines the function and province of
the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the basis of the
legal system.”217 Perjury stemming from judicial proceedings requires the
speaker to have taken an oath,218 but other laws prohibit false material
statements with knowledge of their falsity, even without an oath.219
Knowingly lying to or concealing information from any federal agency
about anything material is punishable by up to five years in prison.220
Similarly, lying to Congress about a material fact can subject someone to
criminal charges.221 This is justifiable because “[t]he law does not seek to
punish all lying for the sake of promoting moral virtues, but rather seeks to
avoid the possibility that false testimony will lead to the wrong results in
proceedings in which the life, liberty, and property of parties are at
stake.”222 Perjury law seeks to protect the decision-making process and the
integrity of governmental systems.223 In McGrain v. Daugherty, the
Supreme Court held that Congress has the power to hold inquiries and
214. See id.; Kruse, supra note 39, at 162 (noting that false speech confuses
political debate).
215. See generally Michael D. Gordon, The Perjury Statute of 1563: A Case History of
Confusion, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 438, 440 (1980) (noting James Endell Tyler’s conclusion
that “history of Perjury, considered as a crime against the state . . . is full of interest”).
216. Id.
217. Alvarez II, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2011).
219. See id. at § 1621(2).
220. Id. The Model Penal Code contains a similar, though less harsh, provision,
suggesting a misdemeanor offense for intentionally misleading a public servant with a known
false statement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.3(1) (1962).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011).
222. Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Perjury: “Literal Truth,” Ambiguity, and the
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373, 430 (1990).
223. Id.
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subpoena witnesses because “[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change . . . .”224
The same can surely be said of voters in ballot question elections.
Because voters are effectively serving as legislators when they cast their
ballots,225 the decision-making process should be entitled to protections, just
as Congress’ decision-making process is.226 The use of deceptive speech to
create false evidence on important public matters, with the intent of altering
an election, is especially dangerous.227 “It is hard to imagine a form of
private conduct that could have broader negative impact on the state of
public knowledge or on democratic values more generally.”228 This is
especially true in light of social science research showing that people do a
poor job weighing evidence.229 When people consider which of two
hypotheses is true, the choice should depend on the degree to which evidence
fits one hypothesis better than the other.230 However, researchers have found
that people tend to focus on the strength of evidence for a given hypothesis
while neglecting to consider how well the same evidence fits an
alternative.231 Furthermore, people in political debates tend “to accept at face
value arguments and evidence congruent with their interests and beliefs,
while critically scrutinizing arguments and evidence that threatens those
interests and beliefs.”232 Given that people have such metaphorical blinders
when considering truth, allowing campaigners to knowingly inject patently
false evidence or data into the debate cannot be in the interest of
democracy.233

224. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
225. See Coury, supra note 51.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011).
227. Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259.
228. Id. at 1259–60.
229. See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 146, at 238.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Emily Pronin et. al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 637
(Thomas Gilovich, et al. eds., 2002).
233. See Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259–60.
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D. Legislators Should Be Permitted to Regulate
Reckless Falsehoods about Ballot Questions Regardless of
Logistical Challenges to Enforcement
Those who argue against an exemption for falsehoods told in political
campaigns, even with actual malice, contend that hyperbole and
exaggeration are so common that it would be difficult for courts to find the
line between truth and falsity.234 Those logistical challenges, however,
should not prevent states from being permitted to regulate the specific class
of speech at issue here. Clearly, language is a complex process.235 “[T]here
are many statements that are neither simply true nor simply false, but
combine truth and falsity or convey shades of implied meaning that can be
misleading.”236 Similarly, a statement might be literally true but false under
the circumstances in which it was made.237 Yet, these same semantic
difficulties exist for the already exempted categories of false speech, and the
linguistic challenges do not create a constitutional barrier.238 In defamation
cases, for example, courts parse actual falsehoods from opinions to
determine what is actionable.239 “Worst teacher” and “very poor lawyer” are
not actionable, while being accused of “screwing” a client might be
actionable.240 Similarly, under perjury statutes, a witness may not be
prosecuted if his or her statement is literally true but misleading241 or for
implying something he or she does not believe is true.242 This required
parsing, while inconvenient, does not make the exemptions unconstitutional;
equally important, state election officials have already demonstrated a
willingness to do this kind of linguistic analysis as evidenced by their desire

234. See Day, supra note 38, at 662.
235. Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1263.
236. Id. at 1224.
237. Tiersma, supra note 222, at 374.
238. See generally Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973) (finding that a
statement that it is literally true but misleading under the circumstances cannot give rise to perjury).
239. See generally 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND
RELATED PROBLEMS § 4:3.5, at 4-54 to -57 (4th ed. 2010) (listing statements that do not qualify
as defamation).
240. Id. at § 4:3.5, § 4-54, § 4-56, § 4:3.6, § 4-58.
241. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 357–58, 362.
242. See id. at 357–58.
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to limit secondary hearings to carefully distinguished factual statements.243
Given the construction and application of these campaign falsehood
laws, their reach will be limited.244 Many misleading and inflammatory
statements are merely “criticism . . . or unfavorable deductions.”245
Statements that are “extreme and illogical” will not be barred unless they
are also factually inaccurate,246 and that limited application provides plenty
of breathing space for free speech.247 Nonetheless, laws like Minnesota
statute section 211B.06 allow states to set “the outward boundary of
permissible speech and serve as a possible deterrent to misleading ads.”248
Courts should not use logistical difficulties to prevent legislatures from
making their best judgments about how to protect critically important
interests, like the integrity of the democratic process.249 Concern that a
particular legislative remedy might fail to fully mitigate the problem or might
create new challenges is one of the paradoxes of government.250 “It is the
price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal
with obstinate social issues.”251 In this particular case, Minnesota and other
states have chosen to “protect the integrity of the electoral process and the
public from the distorting influence of false speech” by proscribing
falsehoods told with actual malice,252 and that choice should not be disturbed.
243. E.g., B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., No. 4-6385-17049 –CV, 2006 WL 954093, at *3,
*9 (Minn. Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 10, 2006) (finding a prima facie showing that merited
an evidentiary hearing for a factual statement like the speaker had “personally been offered a
bribe” by the school district’s architect but not for an opinion like “[w]e don’t have a
growth/space problem”).
244. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.06 (West 2011) (limiting application to knowing and
reckless falsehoods); B.U.I.L.D. Citizen Comm., 2006 WL 954093, at *3, *9 (finding that only
false factual statements fall under purview of the law).
245. Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981).
246. Id.
247. See Kruse, supra note 39, at 133.
248. Id.
249. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (“[I]t would be out of bounds for
the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem
and not forbidden by some explicit limitation on the State’s power.”).
250. Id.
251. Id. (upholding a law prohibiting material that subjected people to ridicule based on
race or religion). While Beauharnais has never been expressly overruled, the case is unlikely to
represent good law. Downie M. Davis, Freedom of Expression—When May the Government
Regulate the Public Expression of Ideas, 25 LOY. L. REV. 395, 400 n.39 (1979).
252. Brief of Appellee, supra note 207.
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V. CONCLUSION
No one is suggesting that allowing states to prohibit falsehoods told
with actual malice in ballot campaigns will, by itself, stop the spread of
“truthiness” or prevent voters from being misinformed when they go to the
ballot box.253 However, the democratic interests that such laws seek to
protect are significant.254 Discussion of public issues “and the merits of
ballot propositions is critical to our ability to govern ourselves through the
democratic process and reach wise decisions . . . . [A]fter all, we can hardly
be expected to govern effectively when we are relying on false
premises.”255 When the value of reaching true conclusions rises to such
high levels, the potential harm from believing lies becomes substantial. 256
As demonstrated above, the Supreme Court has already found both
private and public interests compelling enough to trump the First
Amendment in narrow categories. Falsehoods told with actual malice in
ballot question campaigns should similarly be exempted from First
Amendment protection in light of the significant democratic interests at
stake.

253. See generally RAMSAY ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (finding that voters were
substantially misinformed about important issues including government bailout of the auto
industry and economists’ view of economic stimulus spending); Blanton, supra note 45.
254. Spottswood, supra note 168, at 1259.
255. Id.
256. Id.

